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EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS: SLIDING
DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE?
JOHN KEOWN*
INTRODUCTION
There is only one country in which euthanasia is officially
condoned and widely practiced: the Netherlands. Although
euthanasia is proscribed by the Dutch Penal Code, the Dutch
Supreme Court held in 1984 that a doctor who kills a patient may
in certain circumstances successfully invoke the defense of neces-
sity, also contained in the Code, to justify the killing. In the same
year, the Royal Dutch Medical Association (K.N.M.G.) issued its
members guidelines for euthanasia. Since that time the lives of
thousands of Dutch patients have been intentionally shortened
by their doctors.
Both the legal and medical guidelines include a central
requirement that the patient make a free and explicit request.
Defenders of the guidelines have claimed that the guidelines per-
mit voluntary euthanasia but not euthanasia without request.
They also claim that the guidelines are sufficiently strict and pre-
cise to prevent any slide down a "slippery slope" to euthanasia
without request, and that there has been no evidence of any such
slide in the Netherlands.
The question addressed in this paper can be simply put:
does the Dutch experience of euthanasia lend any support to the
claims of supporters of voluntary euthanasia that acceptance of
voluntary euthanasia does not lead to acceptance of non-volun-
tary euthanasia, or does it tend to support the claims of oppo-
nents of voluntary euthanasia that it leads down a "slippery slope"
to euthanasia without request?
The "slippery slope" argument is often thought of as one
argument but it is more accurately understood as comprising two
independent yet related forms: the "logical" and the "empiri-
cal." In its logical form, the argument runs that acceptance of
voluntary euthanasia leads to acceptance of at least non-voluntary
euthanasia (that is, the killing of patients incapable of requesting
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge; Fellow and Tutor,
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euthanasia such as newborns or those with advanced senile
dementia). Arguments for voluntary euthanasia rest on the judg-
ment that some lives are not "worth" living. Doctors are not
automata who simply execute their patients' wishes, however
autonomous. They are professionals who form their own judg-
ment about the merits of any request for medical intervention. A
responsible doctor would no more euthanatize a patient just
because the patient autonomously asked for it any more than the
doctor would prescribe anti-depressant drugs for a patient just
because the patient autonomously requested them. The doctor,
if acting professionally, would decide in each case whether the
intervention was truly in the patient's best interests. Conse-
quently, the alleged justification of voluntary euthanasia rests
fundamentally not on the patient's autonomous request but on
the doctor's judgment that the request is justified because the patient no
longer has a life "worth" living. If a doctor can make this judgment
in relation to an autonomous patient, he can, logically, make it
in relation to an incompetent patient. Moreover, if death is a
"benefit" for competent patients suffering certain conditions,
why should it be denied incompetent patients suffering from the
same conditions?
In its "empirical" form, the "slippery slope" argument asserts
that even if a line can in principle be drawn between voluntary
and non-voluntary euthanasia, a slide will occur in practice
because the safeguards to prevent it cannot be made effective. A
common illustration of the argument in this form is the experi-
ence of legalized abortion in England, where the law allowing
therapeutic abortion has conspicuously failed to prevent wide-
spread abortion for social reasons.'
The empirical argument is, of course, dependent on empiri-
cal evidence. Invaluable evidence about euthanasia in the
Netherlands has of late been provided by a large-scale survey car-
ried out on behalf of a Commission appointed by the Dutch Gov-
ernment to investigate medical decision-making in the
Netherlands at the end of life. This article makes comprehensive
use of this evidence.
The paper comprises three parts. Part I outlines both the
relevant law as laid down by the Dutch Supreme Court and the
guidelines for euthanasia prescribed by the K.N.M.G., and con-
1. For excellent expositions of the "slippery slope" argument against
euthanasia, see Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy
Killing"Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958); Luke Gormally, Walton, Davies
and Boyd and the Legalization of Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL,
CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECtiVES (John Keown ed., forthcoming 1995).
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siders their alleged precision and strictness. Part II summarizes
the evidence, including that contained in the above survey,
which indicates widespread breach of those guidelines (espe-
cially the practice of euthanasia without request). Part III exam-
ines the slide from voluntary to non-voluntary euthanasia in
Dutch practice and the shift in Dutch opinion towards condona-
tion of non-voluntary euthanasia. The paper concludes that
there is ample evidence from the Dutch experience to substanti-
ate the relevance of the "slippery slope" argument in both its
forms.
First, an important word about terminology. A standard def-
inition of "euthanasia" is "lt] he intentional putting to death of a
person with an incurable or painful disease."2 It is common to
refer to euthanasia carried out by an act as "active" euthanasia
and euthanasia by omission as "passive" euthanasia. Common
definitions further distinguish between "voluntary," "non-volun-
tary," and "involuntary" euthanasia, which refer, respectively, to
euthanasia where the patient requests it, where the patient is
incompetent, and where the patient is competent but has made
no request.
Dutch definitions of "euthanasia" are, typically, markedly
narrower, such as "the purposeful acting to terminate life by
someone other than the person concerned upon request of the
latter."3 It will be apparent that this is narrower than the usual
definition in two respects: it is limited to cases of active4 killing,
and there must be a request by the patient. In short, the Dutch
definition corresponds to what is normally called "active, volun-
tary euthanasia."
I. STRICT SAFEGUARDS?
A. The Legal and Professional Guidelines
Taking the life of another person at his request is an offense
contrary to Article 293 of the Penal Code (as amended in 1891),
2. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 544 (25th ed. 1990). See also infra note
72.
3. P. J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions
Concerning the End of Life, 22 HEALTH POL'Y 1, 5 (1992) (special issue containing
the English language translation of a survey conducted by the Erasmus
University Department of Public Health and Social Medicine) [hereinafter
Survey]. A summary of the Survey appears in 338 LANCET 669 (1991).
4. A Report of the K.N.M.G. on euthanasia, though, states: "All activities
or non-activities with the purpose to terminate a patient's life are defined as
euthanasia." VISION ON EuTHANASIA 15 (a translation by the K.N.M.G. in 1986
of its report STANDPUNT INZAKE EUTHANASIE published in 39 Medisch Contact 990
(1984)).
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and assisting suicide is prohibited by Article 294. In 1984, how-
ever, in the Alkmaar case, the Dutch Supreme Court allowed a
doctor's appeal against conviction for intentionally killing one of
his elderly patients at her request. The Court held that the lower
courts had wrongly failed to consider whether he had been faced
with a "conflict of duties"5 (his duty to obey Article 293 on the
one hand and his duty to relieve his patient's suffering on the
other), whether "according to responsible medical Opinion"6
measured by the "prevailing standards of medical ethics" a situa-
tion of "necessity" existed, and whether he had, therefore, been
entitled to the defense of necessity, contained in Article 40.'
This decision is remarkable for a number of reasons. First,
the necessity defense has traditionally been understood asjustify-
ing an ostensible breach of the law in order to save life (as by
pushing someone out of the path of an oncoming car), not to
take it. Second, the judgment fails to explain why the doctor's
duty to alleviate suffering overrides his duty not to kill. Finally,
the Court appears to abdicate the power to determine the cir-
cumstances in which killing attracts the necessity defense to med-
ical opinion.
In a series of decisions following this landmark case, lower
courts have laid down a number of conditions which have hith-
erto been understood as being required for a doctor to avail him-
self of the necessity defense, though there is increasing
uncertainty as to which, if any, are required. Subject to this
important caveat, these conditions were listed in 1989 by Mrs.
Borst-Eilers, then Chairman of the Dutch Health Council, as
follows:
1. The request for euthanasia must come only from the
patient and must be entirely free and voluntary.
2. The patient's request must be well-considered, durable
and persistent.
3. The patient must be experiencing intolerable (not
necessarily physical) suffering, with no prospect of
improvement.
4. Euthanasia must be a last resort. Other alternatives to
alleviate the patient's situation must have been consid-
ered and found wanting.
5. Euthanasia must be performed by a physician.
5. 106NJ451, 452 (H.R. 1985). See also .J. Keown, The Law and Practice of
Euthanasia in The Netherlands, 108 L.Q. REv. 51, 51-57 (1992).
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6. The physician must consult with an independent physi-
cian colleague who has experience in this field.10
Moreover, having performed euthanasia, the doctor should not
certify death by "natural causes," which would involve the offense
of falsifying a death certificate, but should call in the local medi-
cal examiner to investigate. The medical examiner should carry
out an external inspection of the corpse, interview the doctor,
and file a report with the local prosecutor, who should decide
whether to investigate further or to allow the body to be handed
over to the next-of-kin.
Three months before the landmark Supreme Court decision
in 1984, the K.N.M.G. published a report setting out its criteria
for permissible euthanasia.1 ' They are substantially similar to
the conditions just listed and require a voluntary request by the
patient which is well-considered and persistent, unacceptable suf-
fering by the patient, and consultation by the doctor with a col-
league working in the same institution and with an independent
doctor.'" The K.N.M.G. subsequently formulated, in collabora-
tion with the National Association of Nurses, certain "Guidelines
for Euthanasia"1" which embody the above criteria.
B. "Precisely Defined" and "Strict"?
Before considering the evidence which indicates the extent
to which the practice of euthanasia conforms to the above
requirements, some comment is called for on the nature of those
requirements and particularly on the extent to which they are
capable of closely regulating the practice of euthanasia.
A leading Dutch defender of euthanasia has claimed (a
claim reproduced with uncritical, almost robot-like repetition in
many newspaper articles on this subject) that the Guidelines are
"strict" and "precise."' 4 However, even a cursory examination
indicates that this is not the case. For one thing, it is not even
possible precisely to identify the legal criteria, let alone define
them: the Supreme Court did not lay down a precise list and
lower courts have issued sets of criteria which are far from con-
gruent. For another, as Professor Leenen, a leading Dutch
health lawyer (and supporter of legalized euthanasia) has
10. Keown, supra note 5, at 56.
11. VISION ON EUTHANASIA, supra note 4.
12. Id. at 8-11.
13. Guidelines for Euthanasia, 3 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 429 (Walter Lagerwey
trans., 1988) [hereinafter Guidelines].
14. Henk Rigter, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Distinguishing Facts from
Fiction, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 31 (1989). For an example of uncritical
reference to "strict" guidelines, see INDEPENDENT, June 30, 1994, at 25.
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observed, concepts such as "unbearable pain" (a fortiori, one
might add, "suffering") are open to subjective interpretation and
are incapable of precise definition.15 As for the assertion that
the Guidelines are "strict," this too is difficult to sustain, not only
because of their imprecision but also because of the absence of
any effective independent check on the doctor's decision-making
to ensure that they are satisfied.
A hypothetical case may help highlight their inherent vague-
ness. A leading, respected Dutch practitioner of euthanasia has
said that he would be put in a very difficult position if a patient
told him that he wanted euthanasia because he felt a nuisance to
his relatives who wanted him dead so they could enjoy his estate.
Asked whether he would rule out euthanasia in such a case, the
doctor replied:
I . . . think in the end I wouldn't, because that kind of
influence - these children wanting the money now - is the
same kind of power from the past that ... shaped us all.
The same thing goes for religion . . . education . . . the
kind of family he was raised in, all kinds of influences from
the past that we can't put aside.' 6
If such a leading practitioner of euthanasia, who has delivered
many lectures on the subject inside and outside the Netherlands
(including lectures to Dutch police on how to handle euthanasia
cases), can interpret the Guidelines'requirements of "entirely free
and voluntary request" and "unbearable suffering" as possibly
extending to such a case, little more need be said about their
inherent vagueness and elasticity. In short, because of the Guide-
lines' vagueness and the fact that they entrust the decision-mak-
ing to the individual practitioner, they are simply incapable of
ensuring that euthanasia is carried out only in accordance with
the criteria they specify. The empirical evidence which confirms
the inability of the Guidelines to regulate euthanasia effectively is
set out in Part II.
II. EUTHANASIA IN PRACTICE: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A. The Origins of the Remmelink Commission and the van der Maas
Survey
The Dutch coalition government which assumed office in
1989 decided to appoint a Commission to report on the "extent
15. H.J.J. Leenen, The Definition of Euthanasia, 3 MED. & L. 333, 334
(1984).
16. Interview with Dr. Herbert Cohen (July 26, 1989).
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and nature of medical euthanasia practice." 7 A Commission
under the chairmanship of the Attorney-General, Professor Rem-
melink, was appointed on January 17, 1990 by the Minister of
Justice and the State Secretary for Welfare, Health and Culture,
and was asked to report on the practice by, physicians of "per-
forming an act or omission . . . to terminate [the] life of a
patient, with or without an explicit and serious request of the
patient to this end." i"
To assist the discharge of this responsibility, the Commission
asked PJ. van, der Maas, Professor of Public Health and Social
Medicine at Erasmus University, to carry out a survey which
would produce qualitative and quantitative information on the
practice of euthanasia. The Commission and van der Maas
agreed that the survey should embrace all medical decisions
affecting the end of life so that euthanasia could be seen within
that broader context. The umbrella term "Medical Decisions
Concerning the End of Life" ("MDELs") includes "all decisions
by physicians concerning courses of action aimed at hastening
the end of life of the patient or courses of action for which the
physician takes into account the probability that the end of life of
the patient is hastened."19 MDELs comprise the administration,
supply, or prescription of a drug, the withdrawal or withholding
of a treatment (including resuscitation and tube-feeding), and
the refusal of a request for euthanasia or assisted suicide.2 ° The
Commission's Repor"1 and the Survey2 were published in Dutch
in September 1991. One year later, the Survey was published in
English. 3
17. Survey, supra note 3, at 3.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id. at 19-20.
20. Id. at 20.
21. MEDISCHE BESLISSINGEN ROND HET LEVENSEINDE, RAPPORT VAN DE
COMMISSIE ONDERZOEK MEDISCHE PRAKTIJK INZAKE EUTHANASIE (1991)
[hereinafter REPORT].
22. MEDISCHE BESLISSINGEN ROND HET LEVENSEINDE, HET ONDERZOEK
VOOR DE COMMISSIE ONDERZOEK MEDISCHE PRAKTIJK INZAKE EUTHANASIE (1991).
23. Survey, supra note 3. Oddly, the Report has not been translated,
though a brief English summary has been produced by the Ministry of Justice.
OUTLINES (sic) REPORT COMMISSION INQUIRY INTO MEDICAL PRACTIcE WITH
REGARD TO EUTHANASIA 1991 [hereinafter OUTLINE]. Dr. Richard Fenigsen,
First Reactions to the Report of the Committee on Euthanasia (1991)
(unpublished), contains a -translation of key passages of the Report. I am
grateful to Dr. Fenigsen for permission to rely on his translation. See Report of
the Dutch Governmental Committee on Euthanasia, 7 ISSuEs IN L. & MED. 365 (H.
Jochemsen trans., 1991).
1995]
414 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
A previous paper of mine14 suggested that the Dutch experi-
ence lends support to the "slippery slope" argument in both its
"logical" and "empirical" forms.25 Do the Report and Survey
require that suggestion to be qualified? The answer on an uncrit-
ical reading of the Report would be yes. But a reading of the
Report in the light of its Survey yields a contrary answer. Indeed,
taken together, the Survey and Report tend forcefully to confirm
the application of the argument in both its forms.
B. The Findings of the Survey and the Conclusions of the
Commission
After an outline of the Survey's findings about the incidence
of euthanasia, consideration will be given to the light the Survey
and the Report shed on the extent to which doctors observe the
criteria laid down by the courts and the K.N.M.G. in practice.
Attention will focus on the Survey rather than the Report because
the Report contains the Commission's conclusions in the light of
the Survey, while the Survey is a comprehensive empirical study
which stands independent of the Report. The conclusions drawn
in the Report are frequently difficult to square with the findings of
the Survey.
1. Methodology
Before turning to the Survey's findings, a summary of its
methodology is appropriate. The Survey comprised three studies.
a. The Retrospective Study6
A sample of 406 doctors was drawn from general practition-
ers (G.P.s), specialists (concerned with MDELs), and nursing
home doctors, of whom 91% agreed to participate. The doctors
were interviewed on average for two and a half hours, almost
always by another doctor.27 The respondent was asked about rel-
evant types of decisions. If he or she had made a decision of a
24. Keown, supra note 5.
25. Id. at 61-78.
26. See Survey, supra note 3, at Part II (chapters 4-10).
27. Id. at 14-17, 191. The authors considered whether those who refused
to participate formed a select group which could lead to serious bias and
concluded that, in the light of the total number of refusals (41) and the variety
of reasons for refusing (mainly lack of time), this could hardly be so. The 15
who refused to participate because they disapproved of the Survey, did not wish
to comment, or opposed euthanasia could only have introduced a "very
modest" bias. Id. at 228. This reasoning is unpersuasive: does the conclusion
excluding bias not depend on answers which are unverified? Is it not possible
that some of the 41 who declined to participate frequently performed
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given type, the last occasion on which he or she had done so was
discussed in greater detail. At most, ten cases were discussed
with each doctor.2"
b. The Death Certificate StudyP
This study examined a stratified sample of 8;500 deaths
occurring in the Netherlands from July through November 1990.
The treating doctor was identified from each death certificate
and was sent a short questionnaire which could be returned
anonymously. The response rate was 73%.30
c. The Prospective Study?1
Each of the doctors interviewed in the retrospective study
was asked at interview if he or she would complete a question-
naire about each of their patients who died in the following six
months. This study had several advantages: there would be little
memory distortion because the questionnaire would be com-
pleted soon after the death, it would provide additional informa-
tion to strengthen the quantitative basis of the interview study,
and the carefully planned selection of respondents meant that
the responses were representative of 95% of all deaths. The
study ran from mid-November 1990 to the end of May 1991.
80% of those involved in the first study participated, completing
over 2,250 questionnaires.32 In all, each of some 322 doctors
supplied information about, on average, seven deaths.5 3 The
method of collection of data in all three studies was such that
anonymity of participants could be guaranteed.34
2. The Incidence of Euthanasia
In 1990, the year covered by the Survey, there were almost
130,000 deaths in the Netherlands from all causes, of which
49,000 involved a MDEL.3 5 The Report adopted the Dutch defini-
tion of euthanasia as "the intentional action to terminate a per-
son's life, performed by somebody else than the involved person
euthanasia and equally possible that some of these cases fell outside the
guidelines?
28. Id. at 33.
29. Id. at Part III (chapters 11-13).
30. Id. at 15, 121-125, 191.
31. Id. at Part IV (chapters 14-15).
32. Id. at 15, 149-151, 192.
33. Id. at 160.
34. Id. at 16.
35. REPORT, supra note 21, at 14.
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upon the latter's request."3 6 How many cases of "euthanasia" so
defined were there in 1990?
The three studies differed as to the incidence of euthanasia,
yielding respective figures of 1.9%, 1.7%, and 2.6% of all deaths.
The researchers felt that the difference between the second and
third estimates was "probably due to the existence of a boundary
area between euthanasia and intensifying of the alleviation of
pain and/or symptoms"3 7 and to the probability of the third
study counting cases of pain alleviation as cases of "euthanasia,"
thereby exaggerating its incidence.38
Of the three studies it is, however, arguably the third which
produces the most accurate estimate of "euthanasia." As the
authors of the Survey point out, the respondents in the second
study had no information other than the questionnaire and an
accompanying letter. Those in the third, however, had partici-
pated in the physician interviews, discussing one or more cases
from their practice and the crucial concepts in the questionnaire
for over two hours with a trained interviewer. The authors, not-
ing that a "great number" 9 of interviewees commented that the
interview had clarified their thinking about MDELs, suggest the
possibility of a learning effect: familiarity with the questionnaire,
in which the question about euthanasia followed those relating
to other MDELs, may have led the respondents to reply nega-
tively to the earlier questions knowing that the question about
euthanasia was to come. The authors conclude that the most
important fact was that the respondents in the third study
"changed their approach with respect to their intention when
administering morphine due to their recent intensive confronta-
tion with thinking about this complex of problems."' If the
thinking of participants in the third study had been clarified by
their participation in the first study, their responses are surely
more likely to have been reliable than those in the second study,
particularly since there was an increased risk of memory distor-
tion in the second study because it was retrospective.
36. Id. at 11; see also OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 2. The Dutch define
euthanasia as "the purposeful acting to terminate life by someone other than
the person concerned upon request of the latter." Survey, supra note 3, at 5, 23
(quoting STATE COMMrrTEE ON EuTANAIA, REPORT ON EUTHANASIA (1985)). In
accordance with this definition it has been argued that 1.8% of the deaths in
the Netherlands are attributable to a physician's conscious contribution to
euthanasia through prescribing, supplying, or administering drugs. See id. at
193 and infra note 41 and accompanying text.
37. Survey, supra note 3, at 178.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 162.
40. Id.
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The authors' conclusion, however, is that in light of all three
studies, "euthanasia" occurred in about 1.8% of all deaths, or
about 2,300 cases,4" and that there were almost 400 cases of
assisted suicide, some 0.3% of all deaths.42 More than half of the
physicians regularly involved with terminal patients indicated
that they had performed "euthanasia" or had assisted suicide and
only 12% of the doctors said they would never do so.
43
These figures document euthanasia in its narrowest sense:
intentional, active termination of life at the patient's request. But
the authors of the Survey themselves go on, rightly, to consider
euthanasia in a somewhat wider but still precise and realistic
sense. They estimate that in a further 1,000 cases (or 0.8% of all
deaths) physicians administered a drug "with the explicit pur-
pose of hastening the end of life without an explicit request of
the patient."'
Beyond this, the authors' commentary does not adequately
consider the additional range of evidence yielded by the Survey.
Many other MDELs also involved an intent to hasten death. In
17.5% of the cases (or 22,500 cases) 45 palliative drugs were
administered in "such high doses.., that [they] almost certainly
would shorten the life of the patient."46 In 65% (or 14,625) of
these cases the doctors administered the medication merely
"[t]aking into account the probability that life would be short-
ened."47 However, in 30% (or 6,750) of the cases, the medica-
tion was administered "[p]artly with the purpose of shortening
life."48 In an additional 6% (or 1,350) of the cases the doctors
acted "[w]ith the explicit purpose of shortening life."49
Moreover, doctors withdrew or withheld treatment without
request in another 25,000 cases, and by the time of the Survey,
some 90%, or 22,500, had died.50 In 65% (or 16,250) of the
cases the treatment was withdrawn or withheld "[t]aking into
account the probability that life would be shortened."5" In 19%
41. Id. at 178.
42. Id. at 179.
43. Id. at 40 (Table 5.3).
44. Id. at 182. The third study returned a figure of 1.6%. Id. at 181.
45. Id. at 183.
46. Id. at 71. The authors were not concerned with cases where palliative
drugs were used which had no chance of shortening life. Id. at 72. Life was
shortened by up to one week in 70% of cases and by one to four weeks in 23%.
Id. at 73 (Table 7.3).
47. Id. at 72 (Table 7.2).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 85, 90 (Table 8.14).
51. Id. at 90 (Table 8.15).
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(or 4,750) of the cases, however, doctors acted "[p]artly with the
purpose to shorten life,"5 2 and in a further 16% (or 4,000) of the
cases "[w]ith the explicit purpose to shorten life.""3
Further, physicians received some 5,800 requests to with-
draw or withhold treatment when the patient intended at least in
part to hasten death.' In 74% of these cases the doctor with-
drew or withheld treatment partly with the purpose of shortening
life but in 26% " [w]ith the explicit purpose of shortening life."
55
By the time of the interview, some 82% (or 4,756) had died.56
The above figures are reproduced in the following table.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 81.
55. Id. at 84 (Table 8.7).
56. Id. at 82 (Table 8.6).
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TABLE: MEDICAL DECISIONS CONCERNING
THE END OF LIFE IN 1990
Acts or omissions with intent to shorten life
(cases of "explicit" intent to shorten life in bold)
(cases without explicit request in parentheses)






with the "explicit purpose" of
shortening life




with the "explicit purpose" of
shortening life




with the "explicit purpose" of
shortening life



















A No shortening of life occurred in 1% of these cases. Survey, supra note 3, at 49
(Table 5.13).
+ No shortening of life occurred in 4% of these cases. Id. at 66 (Table 6.10).
- No shortening of life occurred in 8% of these cases. Id. at 73 (Table 7.3).
* 90% of these patients (22,500) had died by the time of the interview and there
had been no shortening of life in 20% of these cases. Id. at 90 (Table 8.14).
** 82% of these patients (4,756) had died by the time of the interview and there
had been no shortening of life in 19% of these cases. Id. at 82 (Table 8.6).
# This sub-total refers to cases where doctors "explicitly" intended to shorten life
by act or omission.
## This total refers to cases where doctors intended ("explicitly" or "partly") to
hasten death by act or omission. Both it and the preceding sub-total therefore
include (as does the Survey) cases where life may not in fact have been shortened
and cases in the asterisked categories where patients had not died by the time of the
Survey.
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Thus, it becomes clear that, while the Commission stated
that the figure of 2,700 cases of "euthanasia" and assisted suicide
"does not warrant the assumption that euthanasia in the Nether-
lands occurs on an excessive scale . . . ,"7 the total number of
euthanasiast acts and omissions in 1990 was in reality far higher
than the Commission claims. To clarify and confirm this conclu-
sion it is necessary to look more closely at the definitions used by
the authors of the Survey in classifying their data to produce the
figure of 2,700.
The commission defined euthanasia as the "intentional
action to terminate a person's life, performed by somebody else
than the involved person upon the latter's request."8 Similarly,
the definition adopted in the Survey was "the purposeful acting to
terminate life by someone other than the person concerned
upon request of the latter."59 These definitions echo the one
embraced by the central committee of the KN.M.G. in its 1984
report on euthanasia as all actions "aimed at"' terminating a
patient's life at his explicit request. This report added that a
majority of the committee had rejected a sub-division of "active"
and "passive" euthanasia as "morally superfluous"61 and undesir-
able: "All activities or non-activities with the purpose to terminate a
patient's life are defined as euthanasia."62
The authors of the Survey distinguished the following states
of mind:
1) (acting with) the explicit purpose of hastening the end
of life;
2) (acting) partly with the purpose of hastening the end of
life;
3) (acting while) taking into account the probability that
the end of life will be hastened.
63
They explained that the first category, unlike the third, applied
where the patient's death was the intended outcome of the
action. The second category was used because sometimes an act
was performed with a particular aim (such as pain relief) but the
side effect (such as death) was "not unwelcome. " " The authors
felt that such an effect should be categorized as intentional
57. REPORT, supra note 21, at 31; OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 2.
58. REPORT, supra note 36 (emphasis added).
59. Survey, supra note 3, at 36 (emphasis added).
60. Keown, supra note 5, at 15.
61. Id.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Survey, supra note 3, at 21. They state, confusingly, that death "may
not" have been intended in the third category.
64. Id.
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because in order to count as unintentional a death "should not
in fact have been desired."6 5 The category related to a situation
in which the "death of the patient was not foremost in the physi-
cian's mind but neither was death unwelcome;"' this was
regarded by the authors as a "type" of intention.6 7
As the Table reveals, doctors intended to accelerate death in
far more than the 2,700 cases classified by the Commission as
"euthanasia" and assisted suicide. The Commission total ignores
the 1,000 cases of intentional killing without request and three
further categories where there is said to have been some inten-
tion to shorten life: first, the 8,100 (1,350 + 6,750) cases of
increasing the dosage of palliative drugs; second, the 8,750
(4,000 + 4,750) cases of withholding or withdrawing treatment
without request; and third the 5,800 (1,508 + 4,292) cases of with-
holding or withdrawing treatment on request.' Adding these
23,650 cases to the 2,700 produces a total of 26,350 cases in
which the Survey states that doctors intended, by act or omission,
to shorten life. This raises the incidence of euthanasia from
around 2% to over 20% of all deaths in the Netherlands.
It could be argued that the 23,650 cases are not "euthanasia"
because they are not cases of intentional killing at the patient's
request. There are, however, two counter-arguments. First,
some of them clearly are intentional killing at the patient's
request. In relation, for example, to the 1,350 cases in which it
was the explicit purpose of the doctor to shorten life by increas-
ing the dosage of palliative drugs, the Survey discloses: "In all
these cases the patient had at some time indicated something
about terminating life and an explicit request had been made in




68. By no means were all of the patients from whom treatment was
withdrawn on request terminal. Life was shortened by one to four weeks in
16% of the cases, by one to six months in 43%, and even longer in 13%. Id. at
82 (Table 8.6). Moreover, three of the four reasons most frequently given by
the patient for requesting withdrawal ("loss of dignity" (31%), "tiredness of life"
(28%), and "dependence" (24%), id. at 82 (Table 8.4)) appear (unlike the
remaining reason - "burden of treatment" (43%)) quite consistent with a
suicidal intent. However, as the respondent doctors were not given the
opportunity of stating that they withheld or withdrew treatment merely
foreseeing that life would be shortened, the figures indicating that doctors
intended to shorten life in a/l cases should be treated with some caution, and
their categorization here as cases of euthanasiast omissions is subject to this
caveat.
69. Id. at 72.
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situation is therefore rather similar to euthanasia."7 ° It is
unclear, then, why the Commission does not regard these as
cases of "euthanasia;" they seem to fall squarely within its defini-
tion. Interestingly, a member of the Commission (in fact, the
member who wrote the Report) has subsequently agreed that
those cases where doctors had, with the explicit purpose of short-
ening the patient's life and at the patient's explicit request,
administered palliative drugs could properly be categorized as
euthanasia.71
The second counter-argument is that the true scale of eutha-
nasia can properly be gauged only when the Commission's
abnormally narrow definition of "euthanasia" is replaced by a
standard definition such as "when the death of a human being is
brought about on purpose as part of the medical care being
given to him." 72 If this more realistic definition is applied, then
the presentation of the data in the Survey suggests that there were
a further 23,650 deaths by euthanasia.
However, there remains a further question about the proper
interpretation of the Survey's definitions, and thus of its figures.
Is it appropriate to include the 15,792 cases in which hastening
death was only "partly" the doctor's intention? These cases were
distinguished in the Survey from those where the doctor merely
foresaw the acceleration of death (where he proceeded "[t ] aking
into account the probability that life would be shortened"
73 ). If
the doctor's purpose in these cases was, albeit partly, to hasten
death, then it seems quite appropriate to regard these cases as
instances of euthanasia. By analogy, if racial discrimination is the
intentional (purposeful) treating of one person less favorably
than another on racial grounds and, say, an employer takes
advantage of a need to make cutbacks in order to get rid of his
black workers, he may be said to have acted partly with a view to
firing black workers, even though his primary purpose is to save
his company by reducing employment costs.
On the other hand, it is arguable that these are not necessar-
ily cases in which the doctor's purpose was to hasten death.
Notwithstanding the researchers' treatment of these cases as
70. Id.
71. Interview with Mr. A. Kors, Ministry of Justice, The Hague (Nov. 29,
1991).
72. THE LINACRE CENTRE, EUTHANASIA AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 2 (1982).
See alo DICTIONARY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 164 (A.S. Duncan et al. eds., 1981)
(" 'mercy killing', the administration of a drug deliberately and specifically to
accelerate death in order to terminate suffering."); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 544.
73. Survey, supra note 3, at 73 (Table 7.2), 90 (Table 8.15).
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ones of purposeful killing, their explanation of this category, and
in particular their apparent understanding of the concept of
"purpose,". in fact leave the matter unclear. The implication in
their explanation that death in these cases was "desired" does
indeed suggest that the doctor intended to shorten life, but the
reference to death as a "not unwelcome" consequence suggests
that death, while not regretted, may not, in some of these cases,
have been any part of the doctor's purpose or goal.
Although it may well be that the doctor's intention in most,
if not all, of these cases .was to shorten life (a conclusion which
would be consistent with the finding that no fewer than 88% of
Dutch doctors had performed euthanasia or would be willing to
do so 74) the possibility that it was not cannot be ruled out. These
cases are, therefore, regarded in this paper as cases of intentional
shortening of life subject to this caveat. However, the force of
the following critique of Dutch euthanasia in no way depends on
their inclusion. For even if they are discounted, the total
number of life-shortening, acts and omissions where the. doctor's
primary intention (more graphically but less precisely called
"explicit purpose" by the Survey) was to kill, and which are there-
fore indubitably euthanasiast, is 10,558. This figure is almost
four times higher than the number of cases categorized as
"euthanasia" and assisted suicide by the Commission and
amounts to over 8% of all deaths in the Netherlands. In other
words, almost 1 in 12 of all deaths in the Netherlands in 1990 was
intentionally accelerated by a doctor.
3.. "Dances With Data?"
The authors of the van der Maas Survey recently argued that
I (and a number of other commentators on Dutch euthanasia)
have misinterpreted their findings.75 One of their main criti-
cisms (to which I shall limit myself in the interests of concise-
ness) is that I have inaccurately inflated the number of cases of
euthanasia and assisted suicide disclosed by their Survey. I
respectfully demur.
It will be recalled that van der Maas and his colleagues con-
cluded that there were 2,300 cases of euthanasia and 400 cases of
assisted suicide76 and that the discrepancy between their total of
2,700 and my total of 10,558 stems largely from their peculiarly
narrow definition of "euthanasia" as "active, voluntary euthana-
sia," in contrast with my standard definition of "euthanasia" as
74. Id. at 40 (Table 5.3).
75. P.J. van der Maas et al., Dances with Data, 7 BioETHics 323 (1993).
76. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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the intentional shortening of a patient's life, by act or omission.
Their arguments for rejecting my total are quite unpersuasive.
Their main argument is that "intentions cannot carry the full
weight of a moral evaluation on their- own"" because "intentions
are essentially private matters. Ultimately only the agent
'decides' What his intentions are, and different agents may
describe the same actions in the same situations as performed
with different intentions. " " And, they add, the agent's purpose
may change over time, so what is to count as the "definitive
description?"79
This line of argument is remarkable. They agree that eutha-
nasia is to be distinguished from other MDELs in that it involves
the intentional (purposeful) shortening of life; indeed, one of
the welcome features of their meticulous Survey is the care they
took to ascertain the doctors' state of mind when hastening
death. They specifically asked whether the doctors acted with the
"explicit purpose" of shortening life, or "partly with the purpose"
of shortening life, or merely "taking into account the probability"
of shortening life, and the doctors replied that in some 10,558
cases it had been their explicit intention to shorten life. Why are the
doctors' own answers not taken as the "definitive description" of
their intention? If the authors thought it impossible to discern
the doctors' intention, why did they bother asking them?
The authors add that no doctor who performs euthanasia
does so with the sole intent to kill: "His or her intention can
always be described as trying to relieve the suffering of his or her
patient. This is exactly what infuriates Dutch physicians when,
after reporting the case they are treated as criminals and murder-
ers."8" However, while the doctor's ultimate intention may be to
relieve suffering, he intends to do so by shortening the patient's
life, which is precisely why, in most jurisdictions, the doctor who
performs euthanasia is liable for murder. If an heir kills his rich
father by slipping a lethal poison into his tea, would they deny
that this was murder on the ground that the heir's intention was
not to kill and "can always be described as" trying to accelerate
his inheritance?
The authors continue that it is wrong to rest the moral evalu-
ation entirely on intention: "For a moral evaluation, more is to
be taken into account, such as the presence of a request of the
patient, the futility of further medical treatment, the sequelae of
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the decision to stop treatment (e.g. will this cause heavy dis-
tress?), the interests of others involved such as. family and so
on.""1 This muddles the argument still further. The question at
issue here is not the moral evaluation of cases of euthanasia but
their incidence, and this is a matter of definition, not evaluation.
And standard definitions of euthanasia include cases where the
doctor, by act or omission, intentionally shortens life.
A further argument they advance is that if the "context" is
taken into account, it can be questioned whether the intentions
were euthanasiast. As an example they cite the 6% of cases of
alleviation of pain and symptoms in which doctors stated that
their explicit intention was to shorten life. The authors seek to
distinguish these cases from euthanasia on the ground that they
involve a failure of palliative care followed by the use of higher
doses which may lead to a point at which "the physician realizes
that he or she actually hopes that the patient dies.""2 His or her
intention is "not necessarily""3 the same with respect to euthana-
sia. A physician performing euthanasia would surely try another
lethal drug if the first failed, whereas a physician administering
opiates would "never" do so.8 4
This argument, too, fails. First, in these cases doctors stated
it was their explicit, not partial, intention to shorten life; the
authors give no reason to doubt the accuracy of this response.
Second, the argument appears to rest on the unsubstantiated
speculation that, had the higher dose failed to shorten life, the
doctor would not have resorted to another method. Even if this
were so, the argument is specious, resting on a patent non
sequitur. If A attempts to kill B by method MI, which fails, his
decision not to resort to method M2 in no way establishes he did
not intend to kill by method MI.
In sum, the arguments advanced by van der Maas and his
colleagues against my total of 10,558 cases of euthanasia backfire,
succeeding only in highlighting the inaccurate basis on which
they have calculated their own total of 2,700.
C. Conformity with the Guidelines?
How many of the 10,558 (or, if partly intended life-shorten-
ing is included, 26,350) euthanasiast acts and omissions satisfied
the Guidelines laid down by the courts and the KN.M.G.? More
specifically, in how many cases was there a "free and voluntary"
81. Id. at 325-26.
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request which was "well-considered, durable and persistent?" In
how many was there "intolerable" suffering for which euthanasia
was a "last resort?" And in how many cases did the doctor consult
with a colleague and report the case to the legal authorities,
whether prosecutor, police, or local medical examiner? 5
1. An "Entirely Free and Voluntary" Request Which Was
"Well-Considered, Durable and Persistent"
Doctors stated that in the 2,700 cases of euthanasia and
assisted suicide there was an "explicit request""6 in 96%; the
request was "wholly made by the patient"8 7 in 99% of all cases
and "repeated"'m in 94%; and in 100% of the cases the patient
had a "good insight"89 into his disease and its prognosis. Oddly,
no specific question was asked about the voluntariness of the
request and there is no evidence of any mechanism to ensure
that the request was voluntary. Moreover, the request was purely
oral in 60% of cases9" and, when made to a G.P. in cases where a
nurse was caring for the -patient, the G.P. more often than not
failed to consult her.91
There is no way of gauging the accuracy of the doctors'
uncorroborated statements about the patients' requests. Even if
they are true, however, the Survey data shows that in the 10,558
cases in which it was the doctor's primary purpose to hasten
85. 98% of the doctors stated that they were aware of the "rules of due
care" formulated by the K.N.M.G., the Health Council, and the Government.
Survey, supra note 3, at 95. When asked what they were, 89% mentioned
consultation, but only 66% the need for a seriously considered request; 42% a
voluntary request; 37% "unacceptable" suffering; and 18% a long-standing
desire to die. Id. at 95-96 (Table 9.1). When shown 14 guidelines, however, and
asked to rank them in importance, 98% mentioned voluntariness and only 67%
consultation. Id. at 96 (Table 9.2).
A smaller, postal survey of euthanasia by nursing home physicians between
1986 and 1990 revealed that, in over one in five cases, euthanasia was
administered less than a week after the first discussion with the patient and in
7% of the cases, in less than a day. In 35% of the cases, euthanasia was
administered less than a week after the first request. M.T. Muller et al.,
Voluntary Active Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in Dutch Nursing Homes:
Are the Requirements for Prudent Practice Properly Met?, 42 JAM. GEJUATRics Soc'V
624, 626 (Table 2) (1994).




90. Id. at 43.
91. Id. at 108 (Table 10.3). By contrast, 96% of specialists and nursing
home doctors consulted nursing staff. Id. Further, two thirds of G.P.s said they
felt it was up to the doctor in certain circumstances to raise the topic of
euthanasia. Id. at 101.
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death, there was in the majority (52%) no explicit request from
the patient. Similarly, in a majority (58%) of the 26,350 cases in
which it was the doctor's primary or secondary intention to
shorten life, the doctor shortened life without the patient's
explicit request.
a. "Life-Terminating Acts Without the Patient's Explicit Request"
In the light of the three studies, the Survey concludes:
On an annual basis there are, in [t]he Netherlands, some
thousand cases (0.8% of all deaths) for which physicians
prescribe, supply or administer a drug with the explicit
purpose of hastening the end of life without an explicit
request of the patient.
92
In over half these cases, the decision was discussed with the
patient or the patient had previously indicated his wish for the
hastening of death, but in "several hundred cases there was no
discussion with the patient and there also was no known wish
from the patient for hastening the end of life."9" Virtually all
cases, state the authors, involved seriously ill and terminal
patients who obviously were suffering a great deal and were no
longer able to express their wishes, though there was a "small
number"94 of cases in which the decision could have been dis-
cussed with the patient.
The fact that doctors administered a lethal drug without an
express request in 1,000 cases - almost half as many as they did
on request - is striking. So too is the Commission's reaction to
this statistic. The Commission observes that the ("few dozen"95)
cases in which the doctor killed a competent patient without
request "must be prevented in [the] future,"9 6 and that one
means would be "strict compliance with the scrupulous care " 9 '
required for euthanasia "including the requirement that all facts
of the case are put down in writ[i] ng."98 However, the Commis-
sion defends the other cases of non-requested killing, stating that
"active intervention"99 by the doctor was usually "inevitable"1 °°
because of the patient's "death agony." 10 1 That is why, it explains,
92. Id. at 182.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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it regards these cases as "care for the dying."10 2 It adds that the
ultimate justification for killing in these cases was the patient's
"unbearable suffering." °103
The Commission's assertion that most of the 1,000 patients
were incompetent and in their "death agony" should not pass
unchallenged. The physician interviews indicate that 14% of the
patients were totally competent and a further 11% partly compe-
tent;1°4 that 21% had a life expectancy of one to four weeks and
7% of one to six months"0 5 (the Survey classed patients as "dying"
if their life had been shortened only by "hours or days," not by
"weeks or months""° ) and that doctors-did not list "agony" as a
reason for killing these patients. The reasons given by doctors
were the absence of any prospect of improvement (60%); the
futility of all medical therapy (39%); avoidance of "needless pro-
longation" (33%); the relatives' inability to cope (32%), and "low
quality of life" (31%).1"7 Pain or suffering was mentioned by
only 30%."°8 And, even in relation to these 30%, if they were
essentially cases -of increasing pain or symptom treatment to
shorten life, why did the doctors not classify them under that
heading?"
In short, the Commission's defense of these 1,000 cases
would appear to be based on a shaky factual foundation and its
attempted ethical justification amounts to little more than a bare
assertion that killing without request, a practice in breach of car-
dinal criteria for permissible euthanasia, is morally acceptable.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Seventy-five percent of the patients were "totally unable to assess the
situation and take a decision adequately." However, 14% were totally and 11%
partly ("not totally") able to do so. Survey, supra note 3, at 61 (Table 6.4). The
authors describe a person "not totally able" as "partially able to assess the
situation and on this basis adequately take a decision." Id. at 23. According to
the death certificate study, 36% were competent. Loes Pijnenborg et al., Life-
Terminating Acts Without Explicit Request of Patient, 341 LANCET 1196, 1197 (1993)
(Table II).
105. Survey, supra note 3, at 66 (Table 6.10).
106. Id. at 24. According to the Survey's definition, then, only 29% of the
2,700 cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide involved "dying" patients. Id. at
49 (Table 5.13).
107. Id. at 64 (Table 6.7).
108. Id. Note that in the instruction to the interviewer it was not
specified as a constraint that the cases involved in the study must be cases in
which the explicit purpose was hastening the end of life. Furthermore. and
surprisingly, no question was asked about the doctor's intention which, as the
authors note, "complicates the interpretation of the results." Id. at 57.
109. HenkJochemsen, Euthanasia in Holland: An Ethical Critique of the New
Law, 20J. MED. ETHICS 212, 213 (1994).
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On the basis of this assertion, the Commission proceeds to rec-
ommend that doctors should report such cases in the same way
as they report cases of voluntary euthanasia.11 0
The Government has implemented the Commission's rec-
ommendation that euthanasia without request should be
reported by incorporating the reporting procedure into the law
regulating the disposal of the dead. The procedure makes it
clear that it applies whether or not the patient requested
euthanasia.1 1 '
b. Other Cases of Intentional Life-Shortening Without Explicit
Request
In addition to the 1,000 cases of active life termination with-
out explicit request there were many more in which the patient
made no explicit request that his life be shortened.
In 59% (or 4,779) of the 8,100 cases in which doctors are
said to have intended to hasten death by pain-killing drugs, the
patient had "never indicated anything about terminating life,""'
and there had been no explicit request in a further 9% (or
729),111 making 5,508 cases in which there had been no explicit
request." 1
4
Additionally, in 8,750 cases treatment is said to have been
withheld or withdrawn without explicit request with the intent to
shorten life." 5 The Commission would have it that these were
cases of omitting to provide futile treatment. It states:
After all, a doctor has the right to refrain from (further)
treatment, if that treatment would be pointless according
110. OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 6. The Commission excepted from this
recommendation cases where "the vital functions have already and irreversibly
begun to fail" on the ground that in such cases a natural death would have
ensued anyway. Id. The Government has rejected this exception. See J.K.M.
Gevers, Legislation on Euthanasia: Recent Developments in the Netherlands, 18J. MED.
ETmics 138, 140 (1992).
111. Gevers, supra note 110, at 139-40. See also infra note 163 and
accompanying text.
112. Survey, supra note 3, at 76 (Table 7.9).
113. Id.
114. In 17% of the cases, the patient had indicated something about life
termination but the "request was not strongly explicit." Id. If these cases are
included, the number of cases of life shortening without explicit request
becomes 6,885. Thus, in only 15% of the cases was there a "strongly explicit"
request. Id.
115. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. In 18% of cases the
patient had "indicated something at some time about terminating life" and in a
further 13% there had been some discussion with the patient. Survey, supra
note 3, at 88 (Table 8.11).
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to objective medical standards. The commission would
define a treatment without any medical use as therapeuti-
cal interference that gives no hope whatsoever for any posi-
tive effect upon the patient. To the application of this
kind of futile medicine, no one is entitled. It is undisputed
that the medical decision whether a particular action is
useful or not, belongs to normal medical practice.
116
The Commission appears confused. First, the concept of
"futile treatment" was not used in the Survey in relation to with-
drawal of treatment, because the authors felt that its meaning
was open to "variable" interpretation. 117 Second, the preamble
to the relevant questions suggests that they were not asking about
the withdrawal of futile treatment, that is, treatment which was
unlikely or incapable of achieving its normal therapeutic pur-
pose, but rather about the withdrawal of treatment which was
preserving "futile" lives, that is, lives which were not thought to
be worth preserving:
[In most instances this] decision to withhold or to with-
draw... treatment ... concerns situations in which the
treating physician does not expect or does not observe suf-
ficient success. However, there are situations in which a
considerable life-prolonging effect can be expected from a
certain treatment while the decision can nevertheless be
made to withhold such treatment or to withdraw it. This
implies that under such circumstances considerable pro-
longation of life is considered undesirable or even futile.
"Considerable" is taken to mean more than one month.'
18
That the questions were concerned with "futile" lives rather than
ineffectual treatment is further suggested by the authors' expla-
nation of this series of questions:
Briefly, two types of situations are discussed here. On the
one hand therapies are involved which will probably meet
with little or no success. Such treatment can be withdrawn
or withheld for this reason. On the other hand there are
cases in which therapies which can have a considerable
(more than one month) life-prolonging effect but in which
116. OuTuNE, supra note 23, at 3-4.
117. There is no uniform definition of the concept of "medically futile
therapy." The term "futile" depends too much on what is considered to "have a
point," i.e., to make sense. This concept was therefore not used in the
questionnaires because its interpretation is too varied. Survey, supra note 3, at
24.
118. Id. at 84-85.
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prolongation of life is undesirable or pointless and treat-
ment is withdrawn or withheld for this reason. 19
They add that doctors were asked to discuss "only the second
type" of situation.
1 2
Third, it seems clear that the question was so understood by
at least some of the respondents. Thirty-five percent of the doc-
tors replied that their (primary or secondary) intention was to
hasten death, not to withdraw a futile treatment.
121
That the lives of so many patients were shortened without
explicit request is striking. Hardly less striking is the fact that by
no means were all of the patients killed without request incompe-
tent. It will be recalled that of the 1,000 actively killed without
request, 14% were (according to the physician interviews) totally
competent and a further 11% partly competent. Van der Wal
has aptly commented that in these cases the right to self-determi-
nation was "seriously undermined."1 2 2 Moreover, of the 8,100
patients whose deaths are said to have been intentionally acceler-
ated by palliative drugs, 60% (or 2,867) of those who had never
indicated anything about life termination were competent.
121
Finally, the patient was totally competent in 22%, and partly com-
petent in a further 21%, of all the cases where treatment was
withheld or withdrawn without- request.1
2 4
The Commission concludes that the Survey "disproves the
assertion often expressed, that non-voluntary active termination
of life occurs more frequently in the Netherlands than voluntary
termination."125 However, if intentional termination by omission
is included, as it should be if an accurate overall picture is to be
presented, the Survey indicates that non-voluntary euthanasia is
in fact more common than voluntary euthanasia. As the above
Table illustrates, the Survey discloses that in 1990 doctors inten-
tionally sought to shorten more lives without than with the
patient's explicit request. It was their primary aim to kill 10,558
patients, 5,450 (52%) of whom had not explicitly asked to have
their lives shortened. If one includes cases in which the patient's
death is referred to as part of what the doctor aimed to achieve,
then the total number of intentional killings by doctors may not
119. Id. at 85.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
122. Gerrit van der Wal, Unrequested Termination of Life: Is it Permissible?, 7
BIOETHICS 330, 337 (1993).
123. Survey, supra note 3, at 77.
124. Id. at 88 (Table 8.12). The Survey does not appear to provide
separate figures for those whose lives were intentionally shortened.
125. OUTUNE, supra note 23, at 3; REPORT, supra note 21, at 33.
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be far short of 26,350, in 15,258 (58%) of which the patient had
not explicitly asked for death to be hastened.
2. "Intolerable Suffering With No Prospect of Improvement"
When Euthanasia Was a "Last Resort"
a. "Intolerable Suffering"
The Survey throws considerable doubt on whether euthana-
sia was confined to patients who were "suffering unbearably" and
for whom it was a "last resort." 2 6 For example, doctors were
asked in interviews which reason(s) patients most often gave for
requesting euthanasia. In 57% of the cases, patients cited a "loss
of dignity;" in 46% "not dying in a dignified way;" in 33%
"dependence;" and in 23% "tiredness of life."1 27 Only 46% men-
tioned "pain.
" 121
A recent case concerned a fifty year old woman who had lost
two sons, one to suicide, the other to cancer and who repeatedly
asked her psychiatrist, a Dr. Chabot, to help her die. Dr. Chabot
assisted her to commit suicide and was prosecuted but acquitted.
The prosecution's appeal to the Court of Appeal was unsuccess-
ful but an appeal to the Supreme Court resulted in the doctor's
conviction on the ground that the doctor should have ensured
that one of the doctors he had consulted had personally
examined the patient. A novel and disturbing feature of the case
is that the woman was not terminally or, indeed, even physically
ill. The suffering which was considered sufficient to warrant
assisted suicide was purely mental, resulting from a "depression
in a narrower sense without psychotic characteristics in the con-
text of a complicated grieving process.""
126. The Commission states that Dutch doctors regard the "intolerable
suffering of the patient and/or his natural desire for a quiet death" as the only
grounds on which to perform euthanasia. REPORT, supra note 21, at 32. The
reference to these grounds in the alternative, without disapproval, is revealing:
it confirms that neither all doctors nor the Commission regard both as essential
for euthanasia to be permissible.
127. Survey, supra note 3, at 45 (Table 5.8).
128. Id. Doctors gave similar reasons for killing without request. See supra
notes 106-08 and accompanying text. Similarly, Muller found that the most
common reason for requesting euthanasia was not "unbearable suffering" but
"fear of/avoidance of deterioration of conditon." Muller, supra note 85, at 626
(Table 3).
129. "[E]en depressie in engere zin, zonder psychotische kenmerken, in
het kader van een gecompliceerd rouwproces." Hoge Raad, STRAFKAMER, hr.
96.972., June 21, 1994, at para. 4.5. The Supreme Court rejected the
prosecution's submissions that necessity required somatic pain and that a
psychiatric patient could not make a genuine request for death. It held,
however, that in cases where the suffering was not somatic, a proper factual
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In relation to cases of withholding or withdrawal of treat-
ment without explicit request and with intent to hasten death,
the basis for the decision appears to have been simply a belief
that, in the words of the preamble to the question put, "consider-
able prolongation of life" was considered "undesirable or even
futile.""' That Dutch doctors regard "unbearable suffering" as
an essential criterion is, moreover, hardly confirmed by the
agreement of two thirds of those interviewed with the proposi-
tion that "[e]veryone is entitled to decide over their own life and
death."l"'
b. A "Last Resort"
Nor does it appear that euthanasia was invariably a "last
resort." Doctors said that treatment alternatives remained in one
in five cases (21%) but that, in almost all of these cases, they were
refused.1 2 One in three G.P.s who decided that there were no
alternatives had not sought advice from a colleague.1 33 When
asked to rank the Guidelines in order of importance, only 64% of
respondents said absence of treatment alternatives was "(very)
important."
1 3 4
Moreover, even in the four out of five cases in which the
doctors said there were "no treatment alternatives," they appar-
ently meant that there were no "alternatives to the current treat-
ment," rather than no "alternatives to euthanasia." The question
basis for the necessity defense could be laid only where the patient had been
examined by an independent doctor who had assessed the gravity of the
suffering and possibilities for its alleviation. As the Court of Appeal had not
made such a finding in this case it had not been in a position to conclude that a
situation of necessity existed. Although the doctor's conviction was restored, he
was not punished. For commentaries on the case see T. Schalken, 656 N.J.
3256-59 (1994); J.H. Hubben, Hulp bij zelfdoding en psychiatrie; het arrest Chabot,
27 NJB 912 (July 15, 1994); H.J.J. Leenen, 1 TUDSCHRIar VOOR
GEZONDHEIDSRECHT 48 (1994).
130. Survey, supra note 3, at 85. For example, the evidence in relation to
the 8,750 cases in which doctors stated that they withheld or withdrew
treatment without request with intent to shorten life does not indicate that all
the patients were suffering unbearably and that euthanasia was a last resort. For
one thing, given that 58% of the patients were unable to "assess the decision
and take a decision adequately," how could the doctor assess the extent of the
patients' suffering (if any), particularly as the patients' conditions varied? Id. at
88 (Table 8.12).
131. Id. at 102 (Table 9.7).
132. Id. at 45 (Table 5.7).
133. Id. at 43. Even in those cases where the doctors (two-thirds of G.P.s
and 80% of specialists) did consult, there is nothing to suggest that the
colleague consulted was a specialist in palliative medicine.
134. Id. at 96 (Table 9.2).
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asked of the doctors ("Were alternatives available to the treat-
ment given? Here I consider other therapeutic possibilities or
possibilities to alleviate pain and/or symptoms. 1 35 ) supports this
interpretation. Also, in response to a question about the aim of
the treatment at the time when the decision to carry out euthana-
sia or assisted suicide was made, 77% of the doctors replied that
the aim was palliative, 10% that is was life prolonging, and 2%
that it was curative. Only 14% said there was no treatment. 36 In
other words, just because there might have been no treatment
alternatives to the existing treatment does not mean that the
existing treatment was not an alternative to euthanasia.
But even if the palliative treatment given in 77% of cases was
not preventing intolerable suffering and was so ineffectual that
euthanasia was thought to be the only alternative, does this (and
the fact that in 46% of cases pain was one of the reasons most
frequently given by patients as a reason for wanting euthanasia)
not raise questions about the quality of the palliative care that
the patients were receiving? A report on palliative care pub-
lished in 1987 by the Dutch Health Council concluded that a
majority of cancer patients in pain suffered unnecessarily
because of health professionals' lack of expertise.13 7 Similarly,
more recent research into pain management at the Netherlands
Cancer Institute, Amsterdam, contains the "critical and worri-
some overall finding.., that pain management was judged to be
inadequate in slightly more than 50% of evaluated cases."
138
135. Id. at 43.
136. Id. at 45 (Table 5.6). Why 14% were receiving no treatment is
unexplained.
137. Keown, supra note 5, at 65. The British Medical Association
Working Party on Euthanasia commented that palliative care in the
Netherlands is not as advanced as in Britain. THE BrrIsIH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
WORKING PARTY ON EUTHANASIA 49 (1988).
138. Karin L. Dorrepaal et al., Pain Experience and Pain Management Among
Hospitalized Cancer Patients, 63 CANCER 593, 598 (1989). Referring to this study,
Zbigniew Zylic, Medical Director at the newest hospice in the Netherlands,
comments that it does not warrant a general judgment about terminal care in
the Netherlands but should be taken as a warning and a stimulus for further
studies. He notes that "cancer pain treatment and symptom control does not
receive enough attention and in many places, it is practiced at a very poor level.
As yet, there is no specific training available in palliative care." Zbigniew Zylic,
The Story Behind the Blank Spot, 10 Am. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATWVE CARE 30, 32
(1993). He adds that there are no comprehensive hospices in the Netherlands
because the high standard of care in hospitals and nursing-homes and the
Government's policy to reduce institutional beds have combined to discourage
the hospice system. While hospitals are officially encouraged to provide
hospice care, the necessary resources are not provided. Zylic urges the
establishment of more hospices. Id. at 33-34.
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Interestingly, 40% of the Dutch doctors interviewed in the
van der Maas Survey expressed agreement with the proposition
that "[a]dequate alleviation of pain and/or symptoms and per-
sonal care of the dying patient make euthanasia unnecessary.""3 9
Yet the Commission concludes that its total of 2,700 cases of
"euthanasia" and assisted suicide shows that "euthanasia" is not
being used as an alternative to good palliative medicine or termi-
nal care."4 This observation is quite unsupported by the data
which reveals not 2,700 but over 10,500 unambiguously euthana-
siast acts and omissions. It also sits uneasily with the Commis-
sion's later observation about the inadequacy.of such care in the
Netherlands:
The research report shows that the medical decision pro-
cess with regard to the end of life demands more and more
expertise in a number of different areas. First of all medi-
cal and technical know-how, especially in the field of the
treatment of pain, of prognosis and of alternative options
for the treatment of disorders that cause insufferable
pain. 141
It adds:
Especially doctors, but nurses as well, will have to be
trained in terminal care .... Optimal care for someone
who is dying implies that the doctor has knowledge of ade-
quate treatments for pain, of alternatives for the treatment
of complaints about unbearable pain and that he is aware
of the moment when he must allow the process of dying to
run its natural course. Doctors still lack sufficient knowl-
edge of this care.... In a country that is rated among the
.best in the world when it comes to birth care, knowledge
with regard to care for the dying should not be lacking.' 42
If there is such a lack of knowledge, does this not confirm and
help to explain the Survey evidence which indicates that euthana-
sia is being used as an alternative to appropriate palliative
care? 
14 3
139. Survey, supra note 3, at 102 (Table 9.7).
140. OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 2; REPORT, supra note 21, at 31.
141. OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 7.
142. Id.
143. An expert committee of the World Health Organization has
concluded: "now that a practicable alternative to death in pain exists, there
should be concentrated efforts to implement programmes of palliative care,
rather than a yielding to pressure for legal euthanasia." WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, CANCER PAIN RELIEF AND PALLIATIVE CARE, TECHNICAL REP.
SERIES No. 804 (1990). Dr. Pieter Admiraal, one of the leading practitioners of
euthanasia in the Netherlands, has written that "in most cases, pain can be
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3. Performed By a Doctor Who Has Consulted an
Independent Colleague and Reported the Case to
the Legal Authorities
a. Consultation
A K-M.N.G. - proposed scheme of consultation with- two col-
leagues, one of whom is independent, has never been put into
effect. Doctors stated that they had consulted a colleague in 84%
of cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide. 1" The Survey does
not explain the form, substance or outcome of the consultations.
Again, in respect to the 1,000 acts of life termination without
request - cases where presumably consultation would assume spe-
cial importance - only a minority (48%) of doctors consulted a
colleague.145 Moreover, 40% of G.P.s stated that they did not
think that consultation was very important.' 46
b. Reporting
Only a minority of cases of "euthanasia" were duly reported
to the legal authorities. In almost three out of four cases (72%)
doctors (three out of four G.P.s and two out of three specialists)
certified that death was due to "natural causes." 14 7 By so doing,
they not only failed to comply with one of the Guidelines whose
importance has been continually stressed by the K.N.M.G., but
they also committed the criminal offense of falsifying a death
certificate.
The three most important reasons doctors gave for falsifying
the certificate included the "fuss" of a legal investigation (55%),
a desire to protect relatives from ajudicial inquiry (52%), and a
adequately controlled without the normal psychological functions of the
patient being adversely affected." Pieter Admiraal, Justifiable Euthanasia, 3
ISSUES IN L. & MED. 361, 362 (1988).
144. Survey, supra note 3, at 47 (Table 5.9).
145. Id. at 64 (Table 6.8). In 68% of the cases the doctor felt that there
was no need to consult a colleague because "the situation had been clear." Id.
at 65. Before withholding or withdrawing a treatment without request, doctors
consulted a colleague in 54% of the cases. Id. at 89 (Table 8.13). When there
was a request, the figure was 43%. Id. at 82 (Table 8.5). Before administering
palliative drugs in such doses as might shorten life, doctors consulted a
colleague in 47% of the cases. Id. at 73 (Table 7.4). Muller's survey revealed
that, of the doctors consulted, only two thirds talked with the patient, only half
studied the medical records, and only 17% physically examined the patient.
Muller, supra note 85, at 627.
146. Survey, supra note 3, at 97.
147. Id. at 49 (Table 5.14). Muller found that in 57% of the cases doctors
certified a natural death. Muller, supra note 85, at 628 (Table 7).
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fear of prosecution (25%).148 Similarly, virtually all of the 1,000
acts of life termination without request were certified as natural
deaths. The most important reasons given by the doctors were
the "fuss" of a legal investigation (47%), the (remarkable) opin-
ion that the death was in fact natural (43%), and the desire to
safeguard the relatives from ajudicial inquiry (28%).149
Interestingly, only 64% of doctors thought that each case of
euthanasia should somehow be examined, and the most favored
form of review was by other doctors.150
III. THE SLIDE IN PRACTICE AND THE SHIFT IN OPINION
My earlier article suggested that the slippery slope argument
in both its logical and practical forms applies to the Dutch expe-
rience of euthanasia."' The Survey and the Report serve amply to
reinforce that contention. The examination of the Guidelines in
Part I of this paper concluded that they are vague, loose and
incapable of preventing abuse. The Survey bears out this conclu-
sion by indicating that cardinal safeguards - requiring a request
which is free and voluntary; well-informed; and durable and per-
sistent - have been widely disregarded. Doctors have killed with
impunity. And on a scale previously only guessed at: the Survey
discloses that it was the primary purpose of doctors to shorten
the lives of over 10,000 patients in 1990, the majority without the
patient's explicit request.
How the Remmelink Commission can so confidently con-
clude, in the light of the evidence unearthed by the Survey, that
the "medical actions and decision process concerning the end of
life are of high quality" 5 ' is puzzling. The Commission's assess-
ment is based solely on the doctors' uncorroborated replies,
148. Survey, supra note 3, at 48. The'authors add that 23 doctors actually
stated that they had regarded the death as natural.
149. Id. at 65. Deaths hastened by withholding or withdrawing a
treatment without request were almost all certified as natural deaths. Id. at 89.
All deaths hastened by the administration of palliative drugs also were certified
as natural deaths; in over 90% of the cases the doctor felt that the death was
natural, but in 9% the doctor felt that reporting an unnatural death would be
"troublesome." Id. at 74.
150. Id. at 97 (Table 9.3). See also id. at 98. It merits mention that in a
small number of cases, the lethal drug was administered by someone other than
the doctor, nurse or patient. See id. at 140 (Table 13.10), 143, 193.
151. Keown, supra note 5.
152. OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 6. Remarkably, van der Maas also regards
them of "good quality." Survey, supra note 3, at 199. According to the replies-to
Muller's survey, all the safeguard requirements were met in only 41% of the
cases. Muller, supra note 85, at 628. Even this figure, based as it is on self-
serving replies, may well be too high.
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replies which disclose, surely far more reliably, wholesale
breaches of the Guidelines. In particular, the scale of intentional
life-shortening without explicit request and of illegal certification
of death by natural causes must cast grave doubt both on the
Commission's conclusion that decision-making is of "high qual-
ity" and on van der Maas's opinion that the Survey shows that
doctors are "prepared to account for their decisions."15 As the
1,000 cases of unrequested killings vividly illustrate, the existing
system cannot realistically hope to detect the doctor who ignores
the Guidelines since it essentially relies on him to expose his own
wrongdoing.
Moreover, the Remmelink Report's narrow categories of
"euthanasia" and "intentional killing without request" may sug-
gest to those who have not considered it before a neat way of
side-stepping the reporting procedure. A doctor might kill not
by a lethal drug, which he would be required to report, but by an
overdose of morphine or by withdrawing treatment, which he
could claim with at least some show of legitimacy (in the unlikely
event of being challenged) to be "normal medical practice."
Even though recent statistics indicate a significant increase
in the number of cases reported (1,424 in 199411) it seems clear
that the reporting procedure will continue to provide a wholly
inadequate mechanism for regulating euthanasia and that the
reports filed will continue to provide no more accurate a picture
153. Survey, supra note 3, at 205.
154. This number is over three times the number for 1990, and it is 120
more than for 1993.
NON-PROSECUTION PROSECUTION
AFTER JUDICIAL TAKEN
YEAR NON-PROSECUTION PROSECUTION INVESTIGATION FURTHER
1984 16 1 0 0
1985 26 4 1 0
1986 81 0 1 2
1987 122 2 1 1
1988 181 2 1 0
1989 336 1 1 0
1990 454 0 0 0
1991 590 1 0 0
1992 1,318 4 1 0
1993 1,303 15* 1 0
1994 1,417 7 12 2
JAVERSLAAG OPENBAAR MINISTERIE 1994 (1995). The Table also indicates that
only 14 cases were. prosecuted in 1993. In a dozen of these cases the prosecu-
tion was brought because the patient had not been terminally ill. After the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Chabot (see supra text accom-
panying note 129) that a terminal illness was not required to justify euthanasia,
the prosecution in these cases was discontinued.
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of the reality of euthanasia than they have hitherto done.
Reports of killing without request promise to be particularly
unrepresentative: how many doctors are likely to report a prac-
tice which has not (yet) been declared lawful by the courts?
1 55
Further, even if all cases were reported, this would still provide
no guarantee of propriety; indeed, were all to be reported, it is
doubtful whether prosecutors would have the resources to sub-
ject them even to the limited check which reports currently
receive.
The Report uses the finding that doctors refused some 4,000
serious requests 156 to argue that "euthanasia" is not used exces-
sively and as an alternative to good palliative care.157 Leaving
aside the evident shortcomings in Dutch terminal care, this is
simply illogical, particularly when viewed against the 10,500 occa-
sions on which it was the doctor's primary purpose to shorten
life.
That statistic suggests rather the pertinence of the slippery
slope argument. The argument's relevance is indeed quite
strongly suggested by the fact that doctors had as their primary
aim the shortening of the lives of some 5,500 patients without
their explicit request (and are represented in the Survey as hav-
ing had as their subordinate aim the shortening of the lives of
upwards of a further 10,000 without their explicit request). The
relevance is sufficiently striking even if one focuses simply on the
1,000 cases involving the administration of a lethal drug without
explicit request. Nor were these patients killed by a minority of
maverick doctors: a majority of doctors admitted that they either
had killed without request or would be prepared to do so.'
In any event, it is now evident that some of the leading
authorities in the Netherlands openly condone non-voluntary
euthanasia in certain circumstances. The Remmelink Report
defends, it will be recalled, 159 the vast majority of the 1,000 kill-
ings without request as "care for the dying."160 Stating that the
absence of a request only serves to make the decision more diffi-
cult than when there is a request, it adds:
155. Gevers, supra note 110, at 140.
156. Survey, supra note 3, at 52.
157. OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 2.
158. Survey, supra note 3 at 58 (Table 6.1).
159. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
160. A member of the Commission informed me that these killings came
as a "terrible shock" to its members, who had hoped that they did not exist.
Interview with Mr. A. Kors (Nov. 29, 1991). This makes the Commission's
defense of the bulk of these killings all the more puzzling.
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The ultimate justification for the intervention is in both
cases the patient's unbearable suffering. So, medically
speaking, there is little difference between these situations
and euthanasia, because in both cases patients are involved
who suffer terribly. The absence of a special request for
the termination of life stems partly from the circumstance
that the party in question is not (any longer) able to
express his will because he is already in the terminal stage,
and partly because the demand for an explicit request is
not in order when the treatment of pain and symptoms is
intensified. The degrading condition the patient is in,
confronts the doctor with a case of force majeure. Accord-
ing to the commission, the intervention by the doctor can
easily be regarded as an action that is justified by necessity,
just like euthanasia.
61
The classification of killing without request as "care for the
dying" could be criticized as tendentious euphemism and is
inconsistent even with established Dutch terminology.1 62 More-
over, in view of the importance which has long been attached by
many Dutch proponents of euthanasia to the need for a request
by the patient, it is remarkable that the Commission, rather than
setting out a reasoned ethical case to substantiate its opinion that
killing without request can be justified, should do scarcely more
than assert that a request is no longer essential in all cases.
Nevertheless, the Dutch Parliament has implemented the
Commission's recommendation that the reporting procedure for
euthanasia should clearly allow for such cases. It has amended
the Burial Act of 1955 to set out the reporting procedure in statu-
tory form, a form which makes it clear that the procedure is to be
followed even in cases of euthanasia without request. 163 The
amendment, which was passed in 1993 and came into force in
June 1994, has not made euthanasia lawful but has enshrined the
reporting procedure in statutory form.
Similarly, a committee of the K.N.M.G. set up to consider
non-voluntary euthanasia has condoned the killing, in certain cir-
cumstances, of incompetent patients including babies and
patients in persistent coma and has canvassed opinion on the
killing of patients with severe dementia. 64 It is surely only a mat-
ter of time before such "responsible" medical opinion receives
161. OUTLINE, supra note 23, at 3.
162. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
163. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMIrrEE ON MEDICAL ETHICS (H.L. 21-I
of 1993-94) Appendix 3 at 65.
164. Henk Jochemsen, Life-Prolonging and Life-Terminating Treatment of
Severely Handicapped Newborn Babies, 8 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 167 (1992); Doen of
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judicial approval. Indeed, if the criterion for the availability of
the defense of necessity is what accords with "responsible" medi-
cal opinion, it is difficult to see how the courts could deny it.
The authors of the van der Maas Survey, referring to the 1,000
killings without explicit request, state that legally speaking there
is no question that these cases should be seen as anything but
murder but that "the possibility that a court will accept an appeal
to force majeure cannot be ruled out."1 65 Similarly, Leenen has
recently expressed the opinion (which seems to contradict his
earlier opinion, 66 to which he does not refer) that in "excep-
tional" cases non-voluntary euthanasia attracts the necessity
defense.167 The approval of the courts may not even be neces-
sary: the Chief Prosecutors have already declined to prosecute in
a number of cases of killing without request.
One such case involved a patient in a permanent coma after
a heart attack. The local Chief Prosecutor, mindful of the Rem-
melink Commission's recommendation that such cases should be
dealt with in the same way as killing on request, decided against
prosecution; after questions had been raised in Parliament, his
decision was affirmed at a meeting of all the Chief Prosecutors in
February 1992.16
Another case concerned a dying, comatose seventy-one year
old man who had not asked for his life to be shortened. At a
meeting in November 1992 the Chief Prosecutors decided
against prosecution since "the action taken ... amounted to vir-
tually the same as suspending ineffectual medical treatment," 169
even though they regarded the case as "potentially extending the
boundaries of current practice. "170
Laten? (Utrecht: Nederlandse Vereniging voor Kindergeneeskunde, 1992) 13;
Dutch Doctors Support Life Termination in Demetia, 306 B.MJ. 1364 (1993).
165. JohannesJ.M. van Delden et al., The Remmelink Study: Two Years Later,
23 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 24, 25 (1993); cf. Loes Pijnenborg et al., Life-
Terminating Acts Without Explicit Request of Patient, 341 LANCET 1196, 1199 (1993)
(where they write that, when- all the "safeguards" are respected and "only the
best interests of the patient are taken into account" such killings are "certainly
not murder.").
166. See infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
167. H.J.J. Leenen & Chris Ciesielski-Carlucci, Force Majeure (Legal
Necessity): Justification for Active Termination of Life in the Case of Severely
Handicapped Newborns after Forgoing Treatment, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 271, 274 (1993).
168. Personal communication with the Staff Office of the Public
Prosecutor, The Hague, Feb. 12, 1993.
169. Id.
170. Id. A third case involved the killing of a 4 year-old handicapped
child who was dying. Charges were dropped "in view of the specific and
unusual circumstances of the case, despite the fact that the patient had not
1995]
442 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
The current and growing condonation of non-voluntary
euthanasia contrasts markedly with earlier pronouncements on
euthanasia. There was little support for non-voluntary euthana-
sia in 1984. As has been seen, the very definition of "euthanasia"
adopted by the Dutch incorporated the need for a request.
Moreover, the K.N.M.G. Report of that year was careful to con-
fine itself to euthanasia on request and three of its five Guide-
lines were concerned with ensuring not only that there was a
request but that it was free, well-considered and persistent. In
1985, a State Commission on Euthanasia concluded that third
parties should not be permitted to request euthanasia on behalf
of (incompetent) minors and "other persons incapable of
expressing their opinion, such as the mentally handicapped or
senile elderly people." 7 ' Its Vice-Chairman, Professor Leenen,
has since written that the Commission proposed an amendment
to the Penal Code to prohibit the intentional termination of an
incompetent patient's life on account of serious physical or
mental illness and did so in order to "underline the importance
of the request of the patient."7 ' In 1989, Leenen reaffirmed
that a request was "central" to the Dutch definition, adding:
Without it the termination of a life is murder. This means that
the family or other relatives, parents for their children, or
the doctor cannot decide on behalf of the patient. People
who have become incompetent are no longer eligible for euthanasia,
unless they have made a living will prior to their becoming
incompetent, in which they ask for the termination of
life. 1
73
He added that Article 2 of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
provides that everyone's right to life shall be protected by law,
does not (in his view) prohibit the killing of a patient who freely
wishes to die but that it "prohibits the State and others from taking
another's life without his request."1 74 Rejecting the argument that
euthanasia would undermine the public's trust in doctors, he
expressly requested intervention." Id. It has since been reported that two
doctors who allegedly killed gravely ill newborns are to be prosecuted by order
of the Minister ofJustice in order to ascertain the law relating to non-voluntary
euthanasia. THE TIMES, Dec. 23, 1994.
171. HJ.J. Leenen, Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and the Law:
Developments in the Netherlands, 8 HEALTH POL'Y 197, 204 (1987).
172. Id.
173. H.J.J. Leenen, Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of
Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 8 MED. & L. 517, 520 (1989) (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
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stated: "People's trust in health care will not decrease if they are sure that
euthanasia will not be administered without their explicit request."' 
75
Leenen was echoed in the same year by Henk Rigter, who
wrote in the Hastings Center Report "In the absence of a patient
request the perpetrator renders him or herself guilty of man-
slaughter or murder."176 An array of leading Dutch advocates of
voluntary euthanasia wrote endorsing the accuracy of Rigter's
paper, adding that "problems concerning the termination of life
of incompetent patients, either comatose or newborn, are not
part of the euthanasia problem.' 77 One, the Director of the
National Hospital Association, wrote that "euthanasia" meant kill-
ing on request, adding:
Consequently, it is impossible for people who do not want
euthanasia to be maneuvered or forced into it. The
requirement of voluntariness means no one need fear that
his or her life is in danger because of age or ill health, and
that those who cannot express their will, such as psycho-
geriatric patients or the mentally-handicapped, shall never
be in danger as long as they live.'
78
But how much longer will they be allowed to live in view of
the common practice of, and growing support for, non-voluntary
euthanasia? The argument that euthanasia cannot be forced
upon competent or incompetent people, and that such conduct
is not part of the euthanasia problem because it does not fall
within the definition of "euthanasia" is hardly convincing. If an
advocate of abortion were to define abortion as "therapeutic"
and dismiss arguments that its legalization might lead to abortion
for social reasons, or to women being pressured into abortion,
on the ground that they would not be "abortion" and are not,
therefore "part of the abortion problem," he or she would rightly
be given short shrift. The suggestion, by leading Dutch advocates
of euthanasia, that the moral debate about euthanasia can be
resolved by definitional fiat serves only to illustrate the intellec-
tual poverty of the case for euthanasia which has come to prevail
in their country.
The widespread readiness to kill without any request con-
trasts starkly with the refusal of many serious requests for eutha-
nasia, and serves further to underline the dispensable role of
patient autonomy in the reality, if not the rhetoric, of the Dutch
experience. As ten Have and Welie shrewdly point out, accept-
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. See Rigter, supra note 14, at 31.
177. Letters, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 47-48 (1989).
178. Id. at 48.
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ance of euthanasia is not resulting in greater patient autonomy
but in doctors "acquiring even more power over the life and
death of their patients."17 9
In 1990 Professor Leenen observed that there is an "almost
total lack of control on the administration of euthanasia" in the
Netherlands. i" ° The Report and the Survey serve only to confirm
the accuracy of that observation.1 ' The Commission sought to
paint a reassuring picture of the euthanasia landscape revealed
by the Survey, but the scene it depicts is grossly misleading. As
Dan Callahan has pointed out, the reality is quite different: "The
Dutch situation is a regulatory Potemkin village, a great facade
hiding non-enforcement."'82 The hard evidence of the Survey
indicates that, within a remarkably short time, the Dutch have
proceeded from voluntary to non-voluntary euthanasia. This is
partly because of the inability of the vague and loose Guidelines to
ensure that euthanasia is only performed in accordance with the
criteria laid down by the courts and the KN.M.G. It is also
because the underlying justification for euthanasia in the Nether-
lands appears not to be patient self-determination, but rather
acceptance of the principle that certain lives are not "worth" liv-
ing and that it is right to terminate them. Indeed, the authors of
the van der Maas Survey recently lent support to this thesis when
they wrote:
[Is] it not true that once one accepts euthanasia and
assisted suicide, the principle of universalizability forces
one to accept termination of life without explicit request,
at least in some circumstances, as well? In our view the
answer to this question must be affirmative.'
83
Might it not be argued that the number of cases has
remained static and that the evidence reveals not a slope but a
179. Henk A.M.J. ten Have &Jos V.M. Welie, Euthanasia: Normal Medical
Practice?, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 34, 38 (1992). See alsoJos V.M. Welie, The
Medical Exception: Physicians, Euthanasia and the Dutch Criminal Law, 17J. MED. &
PHIL. 419, 435 (1992).
180. Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, Assistance to Suicide and Terminating
the Medical Treatment of Incompetent Patients 6 (Dec. 2-4, 1990)
(unpublished paper delivered at a conference on euthanasia held at the
Institute for Bioethics, Maastricht, the Netherlands).
181. The author of the Remmelink Report agreed that there was no
control over cases which had not been reported and that, even in relation to
the reported cases, the prosecutor did not know whether the doctor was telling
the truth. He maintained that euthanasia occurred even if the law prohibited
it, as was the case outside the Netherlands, and that it was preferable to try to
control it. Interview with Mr. A. Kors, Nov. 29, 1991.
182. DANIEL C ,N, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE 115 (1993).
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plateau? This argument would, however, fail to dent the slip-
pery slope argument in its logical form. Indeed, even the empiri-
cal form of the argument is, arguably, not dependent on showing
a statistical increase in non-voluntary euthanasia over time. Even
if the proportion of non-voluntary euthanasia cases remained sta-
ble from the time voluntary euthanasia gained approval, this
would hardly disprove either the logical connection or the inef-
fectiveness of the safeguards; quite the contrary. There would, in
any event, appear to be no empirical evidence to support the pos-
sible suggestion of a plateau. Further, any such suggestion would
seem particularly implausible .in the light of the available statisti-
cal evidence and the clear shift in opinion since 1984 in favor of
the non-voluntary termination of life.
That the evidence from the Netherlands lends support to
the slippery slope arguments should come as no surprise. Some
twenty years ago a perspicacious warning about the dangers of
venturing onto the slope was sounded by Dr. John Habgood, now
Archbishop of York and a member of the House of Lords Select
Committee on Medical Ethics which reported early in 1994.184
Legislation to permit euthanasia would in the long run
bring about profound changes in social attitudes towards
death, illness, old age and the role of the medical profes-
sion. The Abortion Act has shown what happens.
Whatever the rights and wrongs concerning the present
practice of abortion, there is no doubt about two conse-
quences of the 1967 Act:
(a) The safeguards and assurances given when the
Bill was passed have to a considerable extent been
ignored.
(b) Abortion has now become a live option for any-
body who is pregnant. This does not imply that every-
one who is facing an unwanted pregnancy
automatically attempts to procure an abortion. But
because abortion is now on the agenda, the climate of
opinion in which such a pregnancy must be faced has
radically altered.
One could expect similarly far-reaching and poten-
tially more dangerous consequences from legalized
euthanasia. 85
184. REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL ETHICS H.L. Paper
21-I (1993-94).
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124, 126 (1974). The Abortion Act of 1967 decriminalized abortion where, in
the opinion of two registered medical practitioners, the continuance of the
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However, the patent reality of the slide in the Netherlands
may not yet be fully appreciated outside (or, indeed, inside) that
country. The slide was not explicitly identified and criticized by
the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, even
though a delegation from the Committee visited the Netherlands
in October, 1993. Perhaps the delegation was influenced by the
statement made to them by a Ministry of Justice spokesman that
"the government held strongly to the position that euthanasia
was not possible for incompetent patients."186 This statement
was made eight months after the proposed change in the law to
provide a mechanism for the reporting of non-voluntary eutha-
nasia had been approved by the Second Chamber of the Dutch
Parliament and one month before its approval by the First Cham-
ber. If euthanasia was "not possible" for incompetent patients,
why was the government providing for its reporting?
A welcome recognition of the slide is, however, clearly
implicit in the Committee's rejection of the legalization of eutha-
nasia, in the light of the Dutch experience, on the ground, inter
alia, "that it would not be possible to frame adequate safeguards
against non-voluntary euthanasia . . .""' Moreover, in the
debate on the motion to receive the Report in the Lords, the
Committee's Chairman, Lord Walton, observed that those mem-
bers of the Committee who had visited the Netherlands returned
from the visit "feeling uncomfortable, especially in the light of
evidence indicating that non-voluntary euthanasia ... was com-
monly performed.. ."188 He added that they were "particularly
uncomfortable" 89 about the case of the woman of 50 suffering
from mental stress who had been assisted in suicide by her psy-
chiatrist. His Lordship could, of course, have gone much further-
but took the view (without saying why) that it would not be
proper for him to criticize the decisions of the "medical and legal
authorities in another sovereign state." 190
Another member of the Committee to comment unfavora-
bly on the Dutch experience, Lord Meston, said:
it did not seem possible to find any other place beyond the
existing law for a firm foothold on an otherwise slippery
pregnancy involved risk to the life, or to the physical or mental health of the
mother, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, or where there was a
substantial risk that if the child were born it would be seriously handicapped.
186. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL ETHICS, supra
note 184, Appendix 3, 68.
187. Id. at 49.
188. 554 Pan. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 1345, 1346 (1993-94).
189. Id. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
190. Id. at 1346.
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slope. The evidence of the Dutch experience was not
encouraging: in the Netherlands, which apparently lacks
much in the way of a hospice movement, there seems to be
a gap between the theory and practice of voluntary eutha-
nasia. One cannot escape the fear that the same could
happen here, with pressures on the vulnerable sick and
elderly, who may perceive themselves to have become a
burden on others, and pressures on the doctors and nurses
from relatives and from those who are concerned with
resources.
19 1
Of course, the reality of the slippery slope may not have
been lost on at least some Dutch advocates of voluntary euthana-
sia, who may have thought it tactically desirable to maintain a
discreet silence about it. Professor Alexander Capron, reporting
on a euthanasia conference in the Netherlands at which this
point was conceded, has written that the Dutch proponents of
euthanasia began with a narrow definition of euthanasia "as a
strategy for winning acceptance of the general practice, which
would then turn to . . . relief of suffering as its justification in
cases in which patients are unable to request euthanasia."1 9 He
adds: "It was an instance, or so it seemed to me, when the can-
dour of our hosts was a little chilling."1 93
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper began by asking if the Dutch experience shows
that acceptance of voluntary euthanasia does not lead to accept-
ance of euthanasia without request. The evidence presented,
which is consistent with evidence unearthed by a number of
other commentators on the Dutch experience, 1 94 suggests the
contrary. Those who thought that euthanasia could and would
be confined to the lucid, rational patient who makes a free and
informed decision to be killed because he or she is terminally ill
191. Id. at 1398. In a recent decision of the Canadian Supreme Court
rejecting an alleged right to assisted suicide in Canadian law, Mr. Justice
Sopinka, delivering the majority judgment, noted the "worrisome trend" in the
Netherlands toward euthanasia without request, which supported the view that
"a relaxation of the absolute prohibition takes us down the 'slippery slope.'"
Rodriguez v. Attorney-General, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 403 (1994).
192. Alexander M. Capron, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 22 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 30, 31 (1992).
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE
CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS (1991); Colloquy, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (1992);
cf. Margaret Battin, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Risks of Abuse: Can We Learn
Anything from the Netherlands?, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 133 (1992).
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and suffering unbearable pain beyond alleviation by the best pal-
liative care available, have been shown to be quite mistaken. The
Dutch experience lends weighty support to the slippery slope
argument in both its forms. Within no more than a decade, the
so-called "strict" safeguards against the slide have proved signally
ineffectual; non-voluntary euthanasia is now widely practiced and
increasingly condoned in the Netherlands. For inhabitants of
such a flat country, the Dutch have indeed proved remarkably
fast skiers.
